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Does the extent of competitive pressure industries face inﬂuence their produc-
tivity? We study a natural experiment conducted in the iron ore industry as a
result of the collapse in world steel production in the early 1980s. For iron ore
producers, whose only market is the steel industry, this collapse was an ex-
ogenous shock. The drop in steel production differed dramatically by region: it
fell by about a third in the Atlantic Basin but only very little in the Paciﬁc
Basin. Given that the cost of transporting iron ore is very high relative to its
mine value, Atlantic iron ore producers faced a much greater increase in com-
petitive pressure than did Paciﬁc iron ore producers. In response to the crisis,
most Atlantic iron ore producers doubled their labor productivity; Paciﬁc iron
ore producers experienced few productivity gains. This article originally ap-
peared in the American Economic Review. © American Economic Association.
The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Federal
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.Does the extent of competitive pressure industries face in-
ﬂuence their productivity? While a widespread view says
that competitive pressure does inﬂuence productivity, and
some theoretical reasons to expect gains exist, the amount
of evidence to support this view is not overwhelming.
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Evidence has been sought, for example, in the impact of
economic liberalization policies, such as deregulation, pri-
vatization, and tariff reductions, on productivity. These
policies are thought to increase competitive pressure on
industries and, hence, to lead to productivity gains.
2 But
the evidence that they increase productivity is not over-
powering. This lack of evidence may well stem from is-
sues such as policy endogeneity. Here we study a situation
akin to a natural experiment in which competitive pressure
was brought upon producers by a shrinking market for
theirproduct.Inparticular,weexaminetheincreasedcom-
petitive pressure iron ore producers faced in the early
1980s following the collapse of world steel production.
We show that a striking relationship exists between the
increase in competitive pressure iron ore mines faced in
the early 1980s and their subsequent labor productivity
gains in the 1980s. In countries where mines faced little
increase in competitive pressure, productivity changed lit-
tle over the 1980s; in countries where mines faced dra-
matic increases, productivity gains ranged from 50 to 100
percent, rates that were unprecedented.
We say that the collapse of world steel production led
to an increase in competitive pressure at a mine if because
of the collapse the likelihood that the mine would close
over, say, the next decade, increased. The increase in com-
petitive pressure a mine faced depended on a number of
factors, but two were paramount: the mine’s location and
the mine’s production costs.
Location was paramount because the costs of shipping
iron ore are high relative to the ore’s value at the mine.
(Transport costs often amount to 50 percent and more of
delivered prices.) The steel production collapse in the ear-
ly 1980s was almost entirely concentrated in the Atlantic
Basin. Because iron ore mines in Atlantic Basin countries
(Brazil, Canada, France, South Africa, Sweden, and the
United States) were located in the region of the steel col-
lapse, they faced, everything else equal, a greater increase
in competitive pressure than mines in Paciﬁc Basin coun-
tries (Australia and India).
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Productioncostswere,obviously,alsoparamountinde-
termining the increase in competitive pressure a mine
faced. The production costs of mines in Atlantic Basin
countries (with one exception) greatly exceeded the pro-
duction costs of mines in Paciﬁc Basin countries. Hence,
on both counts, the Atlantic Basin mines faced a greater
increase in competitive pressure than the Paciﬁc Basin
mines.
Regarding production costs, the exception was Brazil:
its mines had the lowest production costs in the world. As
we demonstrate below, the Brazilian mines were like
those in the Paciﬁc Basin countries in that they faced little
increase in competitive pressure.
Among those mines that faced little or no increase in
competitive pressure, Australian and Brazilian mines had
no productivity gains in the 1980s (and few in the preced-
ing decade either); Indian mines had modest productivity
gains, about 29 percent in the 1980s (55 percent in the
preceding decade). Among mines that faced a dramatic in-
crease in competitive pressure, Canadian, Swedish, and
U.S. mines had productivity gains approaching 100 per-
cent in the 1980s (whereas each had no productivity gain
in the preceding decade); South African mines had sub-
stantial gains, about 50 percent in the 1980s; and French
mines had no productivity gains and by the end of the
1980s were (essentially) out of the business. France dem-
onstrates that not all industries that face a dramatic in-
crease in competitive pressure will increase productivity.
(See discussion below.)
As we mentioned, evidence for the inﬂuence of com-
petitive pressure on productivity is often sought in eco-
nomic liberalization episodes. But studying these experi-
ences presents a number of difficulties. First, a change in
policy may not increase competition. For example, some
government-owned businesses are subject to the same
competitive pressure as their private counterparts; hence,
privatization need not increase competitive pressure. (See,
for example, Caves and Christensen 1980.) Second, there
is the issue of policy endogeneity. Privatization choices
and tariff choices are made in the political forum. It’s often
hard, then, to argue that tariff reductions are akin to ex-
ogenousshocks(orrandomtreatments).Perhapsindustries
that are expected to have signiﬁcant productivity declines
are the ones that lose political support and suffer the
greatest tariff reductions. In that case, reductions in tariffs
mightbecorrelatedwithproductivitydeclines.Third,mea-
suring productivity is often difficult. (See Megginson and
Netter 2001, for example, pp. 332, 346.) Perhaps because
of these and other difficulties, there is not overwhelmingly
support that liberalization policies lead to signiﬁcant pro-
ductivity gains.
4
In the situation we study, these difficulties are very
much lessened. First, the collapse of world steel produc-
tion clearly increased the competitive pressure on many
iron ore mines. Second, we argue below that the increase
in competitive pressure a mine faced was like an exoge-
nous shock. Third, given the simple nature of the product
in the industry, calculating productivity is relatively sim-
ple.
Experience with economic liberalization policies is, of
course, not the only source of information on competitive
pressure. For example, a notable study by Nickell (1996),
whose measures of competition include a survey-based
measure (with ﬁrms asked whether they have ﬁve or more
competitors) and a measure of rents (with lower rents sig-
naling greater competition), shows that ﬁrms facing great-
er competition had greater productivity growth. Zitzewitz
(2003) argues that periods of increased competition in the
tobacco industry (measured by changes in the number of
ﬁrms) led to productivity gains. Borenstein and Farrell
(1999) look at changes in the price of a ﬁrm’s product.
They show that when the price of gold increases, the
stock market value of gold mining companies does not in-
crease as much when gold’s price was initially high rather
than low. They take this as evidence that waste and in-
efficiency increase as corporate wealth grows (and, in our
language,ascompetitivepressurefalls).(Seealsothework
of Baily (1993) and Baily and Gersbach (1995).)
What were the sources of productivity gains in the At-
lantic Basin mines triggered by increases in competitive
pressure in the 1980s? Industry analysts attribute most of
the gains in the U.S. and Canadian iron ore industries tochanges in work rules (Kakela, Kirsis, and Marcus 1987).
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Here we argue that the closing of low productivity mines
(in the United States), shifts in the types of iron ore pro-
duced, and the introduction of new technology were not
important sources of gains. Productivity gains, then, were
primarily driven by continuing mines, producing the same
products and using existing technology. While this is con-
sistent with the work rule story, to show that work rule
changes were the driving factor requires work beyond our
scope here. (But see Schmitz 2001.)
In the next section, we provide a brief background on
the iron ore industry and the world steel collapse in the
early 1980s. In the following section, we deﬁne what we
mean by an increase in competitive pressure and then clas-
sify mines according to the increase in competitive pres-
sure they faced in the early 1980s. In the next section, we
present the production and productivity records of the top
ironoreproducingcountriesandbrieﬂydiscussthesources
of the productivity gains.
Background
Iron ore is used, almost exclusively, as an input to steel
production. Moreover, the costs of iron ore make up a
small fraction of the value of steel, typically about 10 per-
cent. Hence, as the steel market goes, so goes the iron ore
market.
The eight noncommunist countries that produced the
most iron ore in 1980 are listed in Table 1.
6 The table lists
each country’s iron ore production in 1980 as reported by
both the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) and each coun-
try itself.
7 The two production reports are nearly identical.
Total USGS production in 1980 for these eight countries
was about 81 percent of total noncommunist production.
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The table also lists the percentage of iron in the iron ore
of each country reported by the USGS.
Transport costs in the iron ore industry are typically a
large share of delivered prices. Moreover, transport charg-
es depend in an important way on the length of trip, so
that transporting out of a local area adds signiﬁcantly to
transport charges.
9 These features can be seen in Table 2,
which shows rail transport costs and ocean freight costs
for selected iron ore mines in 1994.
10 The table shows the
average rates per ton for rail transport of iron ore from
mines to port of export, the average charges for ocean
transport from port of export to various markets around
the world, and delivered prices for two types of iron ore,
concentrates and pellets.11
To see that transport charges were a large share of de-
livered prices, consider the Brazilian producer Samitri. It
paid $14.00 a ton to transport concentrate to Europe
[$7.50 (rail) + $6.50 (ocean)]; this equaled 51 percent of
the delivered price. To see that length of trip was impor-
tant, consider the ocean charges on Australian iron ore.
The average charge per ton to Baltimore was more than
twice the charge per ton to Japan ($11.55 versus $5.50).
The average charge per ton to Northern Europe was near-
ly 65 percent greater than the charge per ton to Japan
($9.05 versus $5.50).
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When iron ore is used to make steel, it is ﬁrst turned
into a crude form called pig iron. Hence, a direct measure
of the use of iron ore by steel producers is the production
of pig iron. In Chart 1, we plot the world production of
steel and pig iron between 1950 and 1996, as reported by
the U.S. Geological Survey. The collapse of world steel
production in the early 1980s is evident. From 1979 to
1982, steel production dropped 20 percent. Production did
not return to its precollapse, or precrisis, level until 1993.
Pig iron fared worse. By 1996, steel production was about
10 percent higher than its precrisis level, but pig iron pro-
duction had barely climbed above its precrisis level. Pig
iron production fared worse, of course, because steel pro-
ducers thatused virgin ironore (integrated steelproducers)
fared worse than steel producers that primarily used scrap
(minimills).
Steel production also dropped signiﬁcantly beginning
in 1974. However, most steel industry observers thought
the 1974 drop would be short-lived and that world steel
production would return to its trend growth.
13 But the
drop in the early 1980s was different: it became clear that
some mines would need to be closed.
Competitive Pressure...
In this section, we deﬁne what we mean by an increase in
competitive pressure. We then classify the extent of the
increase in competitive pressure iron ore mines faced fol-
lowing the collapse of world steel production.
Deﬁnition
Following the collapse of world steel production in the
early 1980s, the general view as to the probability of the
possible paths of steel production changed signiﬁcantly.
(By the term path, we mean how much, and where, steel
is produced.) Prospects for steel production in some areas
were now much bleaker than those in other areas.
For each mine, following the collapse, we could ask,
under the assumption that the mine’s production costs and
those of its competitors throughout the world did not
change, what were the mine’s chances of being closed
over, say, the next decade?
14 By increase in competitive
pressure, we mean the increase in the mine’s probability
of closure resulting from the steel collapse. If the steel
production in a mine’s local area faced much dimmer
prospects after the steel collapse, and if the mine’s pro-
duction costs were high relative to other mines across the
world, then the mine obviously faced a signiﬁcant in-
crease in competitive pressure.15
Production Collapse and Costs
Location
The drop in steel and pig iron production between 1979
and 1982 was concentrated in the Atlantic Basin. In Chart
2, we plot pig iron production in the Atlantic and Paciﬁc
Basin countries over 1950–96. Pig iron production in the
Atlantic Basin fell nearly 75 million metric tons between
1979 and 1982, essentially the entire world drop in pro-
duction. Moreover, Atlantic Basin production in 1996 was
still signiﬁcantly off its 1979 level. In contrast, Paciﬁc
Basin production fell little between 1979 and 1982, and
by the middle 1990s, production was well above its 1979
level.
Chart 3 shows pig iron production for various other
groups of countries. Between 1979 and 1982, the sum of
Canadian and U.S. production fell by about 50 percent; in
France, the United Kingdom, and West Germany, produc-
tion fell by about 20 percent; and in Japan, South Korea,
and Taiwan, production fell very little.Cost Estimates
A major effort to estimate mine production costs in the
early 1980s was made by the U.S. Bureau of Mines
(USBM) andreported inBolis andBekkala 1987.USBM-
estimatedproduction,oroperating,costsatminesaregiven
in Table 3.
16 Costs were estimated at a number of mines in
each country (or region). The table also shows the number
of mines studied in each country. The costs are broken
down into the costs of mining the iron ore and the costs of
beneﬁciation.
17 The USBM report presents only the range
of costs in each country during 1984.
The top of Table 3 shows data for Atlantic Basin mines.
Canadian, European (which includes Norwegian, Spanish,
andSwedish),andU.S.minesclearlyhadhighercoststhan
Brazilian mines. The range of mining costs in Brazil
($0.70–$2.00 per ton) was everywhere below the range in
Canada ($2.00–$2.50), Europe ($2.60–$7.20), and the
UnitedStates($2.00–$4.50).TheSwedishmineswereun-
derground, so the high $7.20 mining cost in Europe clearly
belonged to Sweden. The range of beneﬁciation costs in
Brazil ($0.50–$1.70 per ton) was everywhere below the
range in Canada ($3.00–$3.50) and the United States
($3.25–$5.00) and nearly so in Europe ($1.50–$4.50).
Clearly, then, the Brazilian mines had a far lower sum of
mining and beneﬁciation costs than the Canadian, Swed-
ish, and U.S. mines.
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The bottom of Table 3 shows data for Paciﬁc Basin
mines. Production costs for mines in those countries were
much lower than for those in the Atlantic Basin countries,
with the exception of Brazil. Brazil was the world’s
lowest-cost producer. While the range of beneﬁciation
costs in Brazil ($0.50–$1.70 per ton) was similar to that
in Australia ($0.30–$1.60) and India ($0.50–$1.50), min-
ing costs in Brazil ($0.70–$2.00) were somewhat lower
thaninAustralia($1.60–$2.60)andIndia($1.00–$5.00).
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Another major effort to estimate production costs was
undertaken by Natural Resources Canada in the middle
1990s (Boyd and Perron 1997). While this study was a de-
cade later than the USBM study and had a somewhat
different deﬁnition of operating costs, the ranking of coun-
tries by production cost is the same in the two studies. Ta-
ble 4 shows the operating costs (mining plus beneﬁciation
plus other charges) of mines in the production of concen-
trate in 1994. Again, Canada, South Africa, and Sweden
had signiﬁcantly higher costs than Australia, Brazil, and
India. Brazil still had the lowest-cost mines.
Mine Classiﬁcation
Given the location of the steel collapse and the mine
production costs, we can classify mines by the increase in
competitive pressure they faced.
Let us for the moment compare all mines except Bra-
zilian ones. The Paciﬁc Basin mines had better locations
to deal with the steel collapse, and lower production costs,
than the Atlantic Basin mines. Hence, the Paciﬁc Basin
mines faced little increase in competitive pressure com-
pared to the non-Brazilian Atlantic Basin mines.
Let us now introduce Brazil. The Brazilian iron ore in-
dustry’s location was not unambiguously better than the
other Atlantic Basin mines: Brazil is closer to the Paciﬁc
Basin than most of the Atlantic mines, yet it is farther from
theAtlanticBasinsteelproductioncentersinNorthAmeri-
ca and Northern Europe. But, as we show, Brazil’s pro-
duction costs were so low compared to the other Atlantic
mines that Brazil could produce and ship iron ore to most
Atlantic Basin steel centers more cheaply than Atlantic
Basin mines that were closer to those steel centers. Hence,
most non-Brazilian Atlantic Basin mines would close be-
fore any Brazilian mines. The Brazilian mines faced little
increase in competitive pressure.
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ConsiderﬁrsttheBrazilianminesandthenon-Brazilian
Atlantic Basin mines as competitors in Europe. Using Ta-
ble 3, consider the Brazilian and Canadian mines. The
greatest possible production cost for a Brazilian mine was
$3.70 ($2.00 + $1.70). The least possible production cost
for a Canadian mine was $5.00 ($2.00 + $3.00). Brazilian
mines had a production cost advantage of at least $1.30
over Canadian mines.
Table 3 also shows ocean freight costs in 1984 from the
USBM study (Bolis and Bekkala 1987). Rates are shown
for various sizes of ships. On bigger ships, Brazil’s ocean
freight rate was $1.50 per ton more than Canada’s ($4.50
on a ship of size 155 thousand deadweight tons compared
to $3.00 on a ship of size 160 thousand deadweight tons).
This difference of $1.50 is just a bit bigger than the (mini-
mum) Brazilian production cost advantage of $1.30. How-
ever, Brazilian ore likely traveled on much larger ships.
Brazil shipped much more iron ore to Europe than did
Canada, and Brazil had much larger port facilities than
Canada. (See Bolis and Bekkala 1987, Table 3, p. 6.) Bra-
zil’s average ocean costs were likely much closer to the
Canadian costs. (In fact, recall Table 2, which shows that
the Brazilian and Canadian average ocean freight charges
to Europe were similar.)
Now compare Brazilian and Swedish mines as com-
petitors in Europe. Recall that Sweden had a mining cost
of $7.20 per ton. The highest production cost (mining and
beneﬁciation) for a Brazilian mine was $3.70, while the
lowest cost for a Swedish mine was $8.70 ($7.20 +
$1.50). Brazilian mines thus had a production cost advan-
tage of at least $5.00 over the Swedish mines. This cost
advantage was roughly Brazil’s ocean freight costs to Eu-
rope.
The same conclusions are reached from Table 4. Brazil
could produce and ship to Northern Europe in 1994 at less
cost than Canada and Sweden.
Now consider the Brazilian and U.S. mines as competi-
tors in Europe. Actually, U.S. iron ore producers had no
chance of competing with Brazilian producers in the Euro-
pean market. U.S. producers not only had higher produc-
tion costs, as indicated in Table 3; they also had much
highertransportationcosts. Theseveryhigh transportcosts
reﬂected the fact that U.S. iron ore was produced in the
GreatLakesregion,andshipping uptheSt. LawrenceSea-
way involved signiﬁcant costs. (For details, see Schmitz
2001.)
Finally, consider the Brazilian and non-Brazilian Atlan-
tic Basin mines as competitors in North America, particu-
larly in the United States. Before the early 1980s crisis,
Brazil had already dominated many U.S. iron ore markets,
for example, the U.S. East Coast market. But before the
crisis, Brazil had not yet entered a major U.S. market, the
one in the Great Lakes region. This market was supplied
by iron ore producers in the United States (their only
market) and Canada. However, as Brazil’s other marketswere shrinking in the early 1980s, Brazil began to enter
theGreatLakesmarket.Eventhoughtransportationcharg-
es into that region were very high, Brazil’s production
costs were so low that Brazilian producers could still un-
dercut the prevailing delivered iron ore prices. (Again, for
details, see Schmitz 2001.)
We have classiﬁed the increase in competitive pressure
iron ore mines faced by looking at their locations and pro-
duction costs. Two other pieces of evidence corroborate
our classiﬁcation. First, the producers we categorize as
facing the greatest increase in competitive pressure when
steel production collapsed are also the producers that ini-
tially faced the steepest reduction in output. (See below.)
Second, following the steel collapse, Brazilian mines were
beginning to ship to some markets, such as Chicago, for
the ﬁrst time. This is indeed evidence that the U.S. mines
around Chicago were facing great competitive pressure.
Finally, as we mentioned, the increase in competitive
pressure a mine faced was like an exogenous shock. The
increase in competitive pressure faced by a mine was de-
termined in large part by the fall of steel production in its
area. The world steel production collapse in the early
1980s was driven in the main by the world recession
caused by the second oil shock. That steel production re-
maineddepressedaftertherecessionwasdrivenby,among
other things, the accelerated substitution of materials like
plastic for steel, stimulated by increases in the price of gas
for cars in the middle 1970s. And the reasons for the
Paciﬁc Basin’s growing share of steel production included
the strong U.S. dollar in the early 1980s and the rapid
growth of many of the developing Asian economies.
Steel production was, of course, determined by choices
of steel producers, not nature. In this sense, the situation is
not a natural experiment and the increase in competitive
pressure was not a random treatment. But it’s hard to think
that the choices which led to steel production falling over-
all, and to Paciﬁc Basin production increasing its share of
world production, were inﬂuenced much, if at all, by the
iron ore industry. The forces driving steel production were
too big for the iron ore industry to inﬂuence.
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. . . And Labor Productivity
We now examine the iron ore production and productivity
records of these top producers. We show that there was a
close connection between the increase in competitive pres-
sure at a country’s mines and the productivity gains in the
country’s iron ore industry.
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Charts 4–6 show the countries where mines faced little
or no increase in competitive pressure. Charts 7–11 show
the countries where mines faced a signiﬁcant increase. In
each graph, production is the weight of iron ore produced,
and productivity is production divided by hours worked
(for Sweden and the United States) or production divided
by average employment over the year (for the rest). We
use the production ﬁgures reported by the country’s sta-
tistical agency if they are available and, if not, the USGS
production ﬁgures. We can do this because, as we saw on
Table 1, the two sources report similar production ﬁgures.
In the early 1980s, production fell little in Australia,
Brazil, and India (Charts 4–6) compared to the ﬁve other
producers (Charts 7–11). Clearly, the producers we clas-
sify as facing the greatest increase in competitive pressure
are also those that were initially hit hardest by the steel
collapse. By the end of the 1980s, production had returned
to or exceeded precrisis levels in Australia, Brazil, India,
and South Africa; it had returned to about 80 percent of
its precrisis level in Canada, Sweden, and the United
States; and it dropped throughout the decade in France.
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The differences in the productivity records of the two
groups is striking. Australia and Brazil had no productivity
gains over the 1980s (and none over the preceding decade
either). Indiahad a productivitygain of 29percent over the
1980s, but that was certainly smaller than its gain of 55
percent over the 1970s. Canada, Sweden, and the United
States all had gains that approached 100 percent over the
1980s, whereas each had essentially no productivity gains
over the 1970s. South Africa had impressive productivity
gains of 50 percent during the decade of the 1980s, while
France had no gains.
Those countries that faced signiﬁcant increases in com-
petitive pressure had much greater productivity gains than
those that faced little increase. The exception is France.
But, as we mentioned above, there are reasons to expect
that not all industries that are faced with an increase in




In this section, we brieﬂy argue that the productivity gains
observed in Charts 4–11 were driven by continuing mines,
producing the same products and using the same technolo-
gy as they had before the 1980s. This is consistent with the
change-in-work-rule explanation offered by industry ana-
lysts for the U.S. and Canadian gains.
Mine closings in the United States contributed little or
nothing to the U.S. productivity gains. Using mine-level
data, and conducting a standard industry productivity
growth decomposition, Schmitz (2001) shows that the
closing of mines contributed between 0 and 7 percent (de-
pending on the years) to industry productivity gains.
25 We
conjecture that mine closings contributed little in other
countries either, although this must await future research.
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Changes in the type of product produced contributed
nothing to the gains. Of the three major types of iron ore
(lump, concentrates [or ﬁnes], and pellets), more labor is
required to produce a ton of pellets than a ton of the other
two. Chart 12 shows pellet production as a percentage of
total iron ore production in 1970–90 in four countries.
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Over the 1980s, there clearly was a shift toward pellets in
Canada, Sweden, and the United States. Hence, the pro-
ductivity gains in Charts 7, 10, and 11 during the 1980s
were not due to a shift toward products that required less
labor to produce. This shift toward products requiring
more labor per ton indicates that the gains in producing
each type of iron ore were greater than the aggregate pro-
ductivity gains. In this sense, the productivity gains in the
1980s (in Charts 7, 10, and 11) for these three countries
are understated.
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New technology also contributed little to the gains. The
technology in this mature industry changes very slowly.
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There have been gradual improvements in technology, of
course, and these gradual improvements have led to much
better iron ore products and higher productivity. Examples
of such improvements include the gradual increase in the
size of equipment and the gradual integration of comput-
ers into the production process. But no dramatic change in
technology occurred in the middle 1980s that caused theproductivity surges observed in some countries in Charts
4–11.
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Finally, while we have argued that there were no pro-
ductivity gains in Australia and Brazil because mines in
these countries faced little increase in competitive pres-
sure, there is another possibility: perhaps there was no
room for productivity gains in these countries. But that
possibility can be ruled out. Both countries began experi-
encing dramatic productivity increases in the mid-1990s.
(See Charts 4 and 5.)
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Conclusion
While a widespread view says that competitive pressure
inﬂuences productivity, the evidence to support this view
is not overwhelming. In our opinion, the sparsity of evi-
dence most likely reﬂects the difficulties in demonstrating
the connection between competitive pressure and produc-
tivity (and not that there is no connection). We have pre-
sented a case study—evidence from a particular industry
during a particular time period—in which an increase in
competitive pressure faced by producers, resulting from
the shrinking of the producers’ market, led to large gains
in the labor productivity of those producers. We have also
argued that those gains were driven by continuing estab-
lishments, producing the same products and using the
same technology as they had before. In future work, we
plan to study these sources of productivity gain in greater
detail.
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1Regarding theoretical reasons to expect gains, a particularly interesting idea can
be traced back more than 40 years to Becker (1959) and Alchian and Kessel (1962).
It may be that a ﬁrm or industry with monopoly power faces restrictions on its ability
to pay pecuniary returns to itself. Given this constraint, the monopoly chooses to take
more return in nonpecuniary payoffs (like leisure on the job) than would otherwise be
the case. As competition increases, some of these nonpecuniary returns are rolled back.
(See more discussion on this below.) Good surveys on other ideas are found in Scherer
and Ross 1990, pp. 667–72, and Nickell 1996. See Parente and Prescott 1999 for an
interestingmodel.Regardingtheevidencesupportingtheviewthatcompetitivepressure
increases productivity, Scherer and Ross (1990, pp. 667–72) provide extensive ref-
erences but still conclude that “the evidence is fragmentary,” while Nickell (1996, p.
730) calls the evidence “very thin.”
2Recenttheoreticalworkillustratingconnectionsbetweentariffreductionsandpro-
ductivity includes Holmes and Schmitz 2001 and Melitz 2002.
3Iron ore production in Brazil, Canada, and the United States was overwhelmingly
in the eastern part of these countries, and we categorize them as Atlantic Basin coun-
tries.
4Perhaps the evidence is most mixed in the literature on trade liberalization. For
example, Tybout, de Melo, and Corbo (1991) and Tybout and Westbrook (1995) ﬁnd
little relationship between reductions in tariffs (or in effective protection) across indus-
tries and changes in labor productivity. Rodriguez and Rodrik (1999) argue that there
is little evidence that open trade policies are associated with good economic perfor-
mance (though their study is at the national level and examines growth and not produc-
tivity). Yet MacDonald (1994) shows that increases in import penetration lead to
productivity gains in concentrated industries while Ferreira and Rossi (2001) and Tref-
ler (2001) provide evidence that tariff reductions lead to productivity gains at the
industry level. Regarding the deregulation literature, there are surprisingly few detailed
productivity studies. (For a good one, see Olley and Pakes 1996.)
5Changes inwork rulesmay lead,for example,to increasedeffort perhour worked
or improvements in how efficiently labor is utilized or both.
6We restrict attention to major producers because data for smaller producers are
difficult to obtain. While statistics on iron ore production are readily available for near-
ly all countries, statistics on labor input are not. Labor input data had to be collected
from statistical agencies in each country. Also, data on production costs at mines are
only available for major producers.
7The next largest producers in 1980 after these eight are Liberia (17.4) and Vene-
zuela (16.1). No other producer exceeded 10 million metric tons.
8Since there was not much trade in iron ore and steel between communist and
noncommunist countries in the period we are studying, here we focus exclusively on
noncommunist iron ore and steel producers.
9If the vast majority of the transport charges were port charges, then transport
charges would not be signiﬁcantly related to length of trip.
10We show data for 1994 because we have a large set of data on transport costs
between locations for that year. In Table 3, we show less complete data on transport
costs for the early 1980s. The two sets of data tell the same story regarding the size of
transport costs relative to delivered prices.
11There are three major types of iron ore: lump, concentrates (or ﬁnes), and pellets.
12The transport charges from Brazil to Chicago were so high because the iron ore
was ﬁrst moved on massive oceangoing vessels and then on much smaller vessels that
could travel the St. Lawrence Seaway. The charges per ton mile were much higher on
the smaller vessels. Also, the iron ore faced two transfer charges (in the Brazilian port
and in transferring to smaller vessels).
13Two pieces of evidence show that the 1974 drop was thought to be short-lived.
First, there was an aggressive expansion of iron ore capacity in the late 1970s in many
countries. In the United States, for example, two new mines opened in Minnesota, at
Hibbing and Minorca, in the late 1970s. Existing Minnesota mines, such as Minntac,
also expanded capacity. These openings and expansions increased capacity in Min-
nesota (which accounted for the majority of U.S. iron ore production) from roughly
41.2 million long tons in 1975 to 65.5 million long tons in 1980. (See Kakela, Kirsis,
and Marcus 1987, Table Z-1-34.) Second, the behavior of iron ore prices shows that
the crunch for iron ore producers did not arrive until the early 1980s. In particular, most
iron ore prices increased through the 1970s, and not until the early 1980s, when the
steel collapse became abundantly clear, did iron ore prices begin falling, on the order
of from 20 percent to 33 percent over the period from 1982 to 1986. (See Galdón
Sánchez and Schmitz 2000.)
14While we can ask about a mine’s prospects following the steel production col-
lapse under the assumption that its production costs and those of its rivals remain ﬁxed,
the steel production collapse may well have had an inﬂuence on transport prices for
iron ore. While this must have been true to some extent, it is also true that ships that
carry iron ore (dry bulk carriers) can also carry other dry bulk commodities like coal
and grain. The ton miles of coal, grain, and iron ore transported in 1980 were of similar
magnitudes. (See Figure 4 in Lundgren 1996.)
15As seen in what follows, it is easy to classify mines by the increase in com-
petitive pressure they faced. It is not necessary to develop a formal model to calculate
the probabilities of mine closure. One could imagine specifying a planner’s problem
in which the objective is to deliver iron ore to steel production centers at minimum cost
(production plus transportation). The steel collapse would change the location of steel
production and involve a change in the least-cost way to deliver iron ore to the steel
centers.
16The production costs in Tables 3 and 4 are operating costs (roughly, variable
costs) and do not include capital costs. Capital or capacity costs in iron ore mining are
very large, but these were already sunk when the steel collapse hit the industry. What
capacity survived the collapse depended on operating costs.
17Afterironoreismined,it nearlyalwaysundergoessomeformof beneﬁciation—
a process of crushing and screening the iron ore to produce uniformly sized particles,
improve the iron content of the product, and eliminate impurities.
18TheUSBMreport(BolisandBekkala1987)alsodemonstratesthatSouthAfrica
had signiﬁcantly higher costs of producing concentrates ( ﬁnes), the major South Afri-
can product, than did Brazil. For example, Figure 19 (p. 33) in the report shows that
Brazil had huge deposits of ﬁnes that could be mined at lower costs than the least-cost
deposit in Africa (and, hence, South Africa). French mines were not studied in the re-
port.
19In discussing production costs, we have been implicitly assuming that iron ore
is a homogeneous product. It is not. Some beneﬁciated ore, that is, lump iron ore, could
be used directly in blast furnaces. In the period we are studying, it sold for a premium
over the other beneﬁciated iron ores, concentrates and pellet feed, that had to be further
processed (namely, agglomerated). It turns out that not only did Australia, Brazil, and
India have the lowest costs in producing beneﬁciated iron ore, but their beneﬁciated ore
was worth more as well. That is because these countries had a much higher fraction
of beneﬁciated iron ores that needed little or no agglomeration. Agglomeration costs
were large. Concentrates were typically agglomerated at steel plants, while pellet feed
was typically agglomerated into pellets at iron ore mines. That is the principal reason
pellets sold for more than concentrates at iron ore mines (as seen in Table 2). See
Galdón Sánchez and Schmitz 2000, in particular, Appendix B (“Prices of Beneﬁciated
Iron-Ores”).Hence,consideringdifferencesinironorequalityonlystrengthensthecase
we are making.
20The drop in Atlantic Basin steel production could have been so great that even
Brazilian capacity could have been threatened with closure. But the drop was not this
great.
21If one played devil’s advocate and took the view that the iron ore industry had
more than a negligible impact on steel industry developments in the early and middle
1980s, then one would have to explain the fact that the steel industry fell hardest in the
areas where iron ore productivity increased the most.22While a detailed discussion of theoretical reasons for this close connection are
beyond the scope of this study, let us brieﬂy return to an idea mentioned above. It may
be that a ﬁrm or industry with monopoly power may face restrictions on its ability to
pay pecuniary returns to itself. Given this constraint, the monopoly chooses to take
more return in nonpecuniary payoffs than would otherwise be the case. This might be
in the form of leisure (low effort) on the job or even redundant effort if jobs can be
given to family, friends, and so on. In the case of iron ore, producers have monopoly
power in their local area given that transportation costs typically loom very large in
delivered charges. As for constraints on pecuniary payouts, mining is tied to the local
area (because of the resources), so that the local political jurisdiction can extract sig-
niﬁcant portions of monetary proﬁts. As competition increases, as the local monopoly
power is reduced (as foreign producers now ﬁnd it proﬁtable to ship into the local area
given that their markets elsewhere have shrunk), some of these nonpecuniary returns
are rolled back. (For more theoretical discussion, see Schmitz 2001.) Note that this
argument suggests that if an industry did not have much monopoly power in its local
area, then if it faced an increase in competitive pressure, it would not respond by in-
creasing productivity.
23While iron ore production recovered to about 80 percent of its precrisis level in
Canada, Sweden, and the United States, so that many operations in those countries did
ride out the crisis, the situation was touch-and-go for many operations that did survive.
In the 1984 annual report of LKAB (p. 3), Sweden’s leading iron ore producer, the
company president, Wiking Sjöstrand, states that “Ten years ago, no one could imagine
that LKAB might ﬁnd itself involved in such a serious crisis as the one which we have
just passed through . . . and in fact, for a period of time, a total catastrophe was very,
very close.” Wayne Dalke, who was the general manager of the U.S. Steel mine in
Minnesota (Minntac) during the middle 1980s, told us that U.S. Steel was threatening
to close the Minntac mine during the middle 1980s.
24Notes 1 and 22 suggested that if an industry did not have much monopoly power
in its local area, then it would not increase productivity when it was threatened with
closure. The French industry had little market power in its local area (that is, Northern
Europe). Its iron ore was of very poor quality. The iron content of French iron ore
(31.4 percent) was nearly half that of the eight top producers (61.7 percent). (See Table
1.) Another aspect of the French iron ore industry’s problem was its location: it was
located inland in the Lorraine, away from the modern coastal steel plants in Europe.
(Thanks to a referee for this point.) There was nothing the French industry could have
done to stave off disaster.
25In a nice study of productivity in coal mining, Ellerman, Stoker, and Berndt
(2001) emphasize that during periods when coal prices decreased, marginal mines
would close, and this led to increases in labor productivity. As just mentioned, closing
of mines was not a factor in productivity gains in the U.S. iron ore industry in the
1980s. For a different view of the inﬂuence of changes in coal prices on coal produc-
tivity, see Prescott 1998.
26At least two pieces of evidence suggest that mine closings may not have been
important in other countries either. First, the increase in productivity in these countries
took place over the entire decade and were not concentrated in the initial period of steel
production collapse when most mine closings likely took place. Second, in Canada and
Sweden, industry production had returned to about 80 percent of its precrisis level by
the end of the 1980s. That only about 20 percent of production was closed (and not,
say, 80 percent of production) suggests that mine closings had only a modest contri-
bution to increased productivity.
27Data are available only for four countries and at ﬁve-year intervals. While data
are not available for South Africa, we know it essentially had no pellet production
throughout the 1970–90 period.
28In Canada and Sweden, the move to pellets was greater in the 1980s than in the
1970s. In this sense, the productivity gains in the 1980s are understated relative to the
productivity gains in the 1970s in these countries. For the United States, the opposite
is true: the shift to pellets was greater in the 1970s than the 1980s. See Schmitz 2001
for a discussion of this.
29The major technological development in the postwar period was the production
ofpelletsfromlow-gradeironore,butthistechnologywasdevelopedbythelate1950s.
30There is a caveat. In contrast to the mines in the other top-producing countries,
the Swedish mines were underground. Underground mining methods of all types (for
example, of coal) and, in particular, of Swedish iron ore have changed signiﬁcantly.
See Hellmer 1997.
31What enabled Australia and Brazil to increase productivity in the mid-1990s but
not in the early 1980s? While answering this question is beyond the scope of the study,
we do know some facts that are highly suggestive. In the mid-1990s, Brazil began pri-
vatizing its iron ore industry. Changes in ownership likely spurred productivity gains.
In Australia, many of the productivity gains in the 1990s have been attributed to
changes in work rules. The Australian iron ore industry did attempt to change work
rules in the early 1980s but was not successful. Two factors changed in the 1990s that
may have led to the productivity gains. First, there was a general countrywide lib-
eralization of labor laws in the 1990s. Second, there was a change speciﬁc to the in-
dustry:Australia’sgreatestcompetitor,Brazil,wasexperiencingsigniﬁcantproductivity
gains and was threatening to capture some of Australia’s export market.
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*Australia reported production for the financial year ended June 1980.
Sources: U.S., various years; AppendixTable 2
Freight Rates and Delivered Prices of Iron Ore in 1994
Freight Charges (U.S. $ Per Ton)
From Port to This Destination
Delivered Prices (U.S. $ Per Ton)
From Mine North America For This Type of Ore in This Market
Producer      Loading                by Rail Northern      Japan &
Country (Company)       Port  to Port       Baltimore   Chicago       Europe     Other Asia     Concentrates Market Pellets Market
Australia BHP Port Hedland 2.25           11.55 n.a.          9.05            5.50                23.61 Japan n.a. n.a. 
Hamersley   Dampier                2.50           11.55 n.a.           9.05            5.50             23.85 Japan n.a. n.a.
Robe River   Cape Lambert 1.75         11.55 n.a.           9.05            5.50 18.74 Japan n.a. n.a.
Brazil CVRD Ponta da Madeira 4.10 8.00 n.a.           6.30            9.60 28.23 Europe n.a. n.a.
CVRD Tubar˜ ao                 3.50 8.50      24.35          6.50        10.30 26.40 Europe 38.03 Europe
MBR Sepetiba Bay 7.00 8.50      24.35          6.50        10.30 30.31 Europe n.a. n.a.
Samitri Tubar˜ ao   7.50 8.50       24.35          6.50         10.30 27.24 Europe 41.68 Europe
Canada QCM Port-Cartier 2.00 5.75 9.95          6.30 n.a. 25.59 Europe 36.94 Europe
IOC Sept-Îles              2.50 5.75 9.95        6.30 n.a. 26.02 Europe 37.66 Europe
Wabush Pointe-Noire 5.70 5.75 9.95          6.30 n.a. 28.48 Europe 43.87 N.Amer.
India Kudremukh   Mangalore           1.50           11.55 n.a.         8.50 7.90 22.24 Japan 34.81 Japan
South Africa Sishen Saldanha Bay 7.50 10.75 n.a. 8.00 9.25 29.04 Europe n.a. n.a.
Sweden LKAB Narvik/Luleå 7.00 9.00 n.a. 3.35 n.a. 29.96 Europe 40.77 Europe
United States Minnesota   Duluth 6.05 n.a. 6.79 n.a.          n.a. n.a. n.a. 43.43 N.Amer.
n.a. = not available
Source: Boyd and Perron 1997Table 3
Costs of Producing and Transporting Iron Ore in 1984 . . .
Costs Estimated by the U.S. Bureau of Mines for Selected Iron Ore Mines
Transportation Costs
Production Costs (U.S. $ Per Ton) By Rail (From Mine to Port) By Ocean (From Port to Destination)
Number           Mining         Beneficiation U.S. $ Per Ton Km. U.S. $ Per Ton Ship Siz e
of Mines Distance (Thou. Dead- 
Country Studied           Low     High Low     High Low      High (Km.) Low      High Destination weight Tons)
Atlantic Basin
Brazil 13 .70     2.00         .50     1.70 .005     .007        640–730       7.00 9.00          Japan               130–150
5.25    6.00          Japan 220
5.75      6.50          W. Europe              50–65
4.50     6.00          W. Europe           80–155 
Canada 3 2.00   2.50       3.00   3.50 .008      .009       410–450         n.a.       n.a.          Japan 130–150
3.00      4.25      W. Europe        100–160
Europe*          5 2.60    7.20 1.50     4.50 n.a.        n.a.             n.a. n.a.       n.a.             n.a. n.a.
United States     9 2.00     4.50 3.25    5.00 n.a. n.a.   n.a. n.a.       n.a.             n.a. n.a.
Pacific Basin
Australia           5 1.60   2.60 .30    1.60 .003      .004        50–430 5.00     6.00         S. Korea 100–150
6.50     8.75         W. Europe 100–150




By Ocean (From Port to Destination)
n.a. = not available
*The European countries included in the study are Norway, Spain, and Sweden.
**India’s rail transport costs from mines to ports are reported as an average rather than a range.
Source: Bolis and Bekkala 1987Table 4
. . . And in 1994
Costs Estimated by Natural Resources Canada for Selected Iron Ore Mines
U.S. $ Per Ton
Transportation Costs
By Rail   By Ocean
Producer   (Concentrates From Mine       From Port
Country (Company)                  Only)            to Port        to N. Europe
Atlantic Basin
Brazil          CVRD, Caraj´ as            2.15        4.10              6.30
CVRD, Minas Gerais   3.15           3.50              6.50
MBR                          2.50            7.00              6.50
Samitri                       2.95        7.50              6.50
Canada    QCM                  9.20            2.00              6.30
IOC                        10.85            2.50           6.30
Wabush                   9.05            5.70         6.30
South Africa   Sishen                       8.80            7.50              8.00
Sweden         LKAB                      10.50            7.00              3.35
Pacific Basin
Australia        BHP                          7.95            2.25              9.05
Hamersley                 4.15            2.50              9.05
Robe River               3.50            1.75              9.05
India             Kudremukh                6.35            1.50              8.50 
*Production costs here may include more than the mining and beneficiation
costs on Table 3, such as the costs of agglomeration.
Source: Boyd and Perron 1997
Production
Costs*Chart 1
World Steel and Pig Iron Production
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Iron Ore Production and Productivity in Countries With Different Amounts
of Competitive Pressure on Mines in the 1980s
Annually, 1960–96 (as available), Compared to Levels in 1980
(Index, 1980=1)
Charts 4–6   Little or No Increase in Competitive Pressure
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Charts 7–11   Significant Increase in Competitive Pressure
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A General Shift to a More Labor-Intensive Product
Pellets as a Percentage of Iron Ore Production (by Weight)
in Four Countries, Over Five-Year Intervals, 1970–90
*Canada’s data are percentages of shipments, not production.
 Sources: United Nations 1994; U.S., various years
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